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PERJURY AND FALSE TESTIMONY: SHOULD
THE DIFFERENCE MATTER SO MUCH?
Stephen A. Saltzburg"
INTRODUCTION

NOT long ago we witnessed an impeachment trial in which Senators

debated, inter alia, whether the President of the United States
committed perjury in grand jury testimony and whether he should be
removed from office as a result. Reasonable people disagreed on
both questions. In the end, fifty-five Senators voted to acquit
President Clinton on the impeachment article alleging perjury, while
forty-five Senators voted guilty.' Although the House of
Representatives did not charge President Clinton with perjury in his
deposition in the lawsuit filed against him by Paula Jones, Judge
Susan Webber Wright held the President in contempt for deliberately
giving false testimony and violating the judge's discovery orders in
Jones v. Clinton.2 Judge Wright thought she knew false statements
when she saw them:
It is difficult to construe the President's sworn statements in this civil
lawsuit concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky as anything
other than a willful refusal to obey this Court's discovery Orders.
Given the President's admission that he was misleading with regard
to the questions being posed to him and the clarity with which his
falsehoods are revealed by the record, there is no need to engage in
an extended analysis of the President's sworn statements in this
lawsuit. Simply put, the President's deposition testimony regarding
whether he had ever been alone with Ms. Lewinsky was
intentionally false, and his statements regarding whether he had ever
engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky likewise were
intentionally false, notwithstanding tortured
definitions and
3
interpretations of the term "sexual relations."
Judge Wright eventually imposed a monetary sanction of $79,999 to
be paid to plaintiff's counsel and $9485 to reimburse the costs of
* Howrey Professor of Trial Advocacy, Litigation, and Professional
Responsibility, George Washington University Law School.
1. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (Senate vote on
Impeachment Article I (perjury)).
2. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125-26, 1131 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
3. Id. at 1130 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Wright's travel to Washington to preside over the deposition.4
Putting aside the question of whether the President's testimony in
the Jones case was material and thus qualifies as criminal perjury, it
seems clear that there is a substantial basis for Judge Wright's
conclusion that the President gave false testimony in his deposition.
This troubled Judge Wright sufficiently to cause her to cite the
President for contempt and sanction him.' In my view, Judge Wright's
action was clearly warranted. It is unfortunate, however, that the
desire to maintain the appearance of judicial neutrality during the
pending impeachment proceedings meant that the sanctions were not
imposed sooner.
It is ironic that Judge Wright's message, that false testimony in any
judicial proceeding, even a civil deposition, is intolerable in our
judicial system, was rendered only a month and a half after the
Supreme Court signaled its own lack of concern for false testimonyeven in a capital case. That signal came in Strickler v. Greene.6 As I
shall demonstrate, the seeds of Strickler were sown as early as 1976,
when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Agurs.7 The
majority in Strickler relied on its Agurs analysis, as developed in
subsequent cases, and barely waved at an earlier line of cases that
demonstrated the Court's unwillingness to permit prosecutors to put
on testimony that created a false impression of the truth, whether or
not such testimony technically amounted to perjury. As a result, the
Strickler Court indicated that it did not find false prosecutorial
testimony shocking and demonstrated that it might not even know
false testimony when such testimony stood naked before it.
Part I of this Article examines the facts of Strickler and scrutinizes
the testimony of a key prosecution witness, Ann Stoltzfus. Part II
evaluates the incongruity between Stoltzfus's trial testimony and other
evidence not disclosed at trial that tended to cast doubt, at least in
part, on the Stoltzfus testimony. Parts III and IV compare and
contrast perjury and false testimony by chronicling Supreme Court
cases that examine these concepts. Part V returns to the facts of
Strickler and argues that the prosecutor created a false impression of
the truth, which remained un-remedied because the Court did not find
that it amounted to perjury, but which nonetheless could have
affected the outcome of the trial and was thus intolerable. This
Article concludes that the Supreme Court's line-drawing between
perjury and false testimony perpetuates injustice and provides little
incentive for prosecutors (and defense lawyers) to offer truthful
4. See Jones v. Clinton, 57 F. Supp. 2d 719, 729 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
5. See id. at 724-25; Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
6. 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999). The case was decided on June 17, 1999. Judge
Wright's sanction of the President occurred on July 29, 1999. See Jones, 57 F. Supp. 2d
at 719.

7. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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testimony. This Article also concludes that false and misleading
testimony produces the same distortion of the truth and likelihood of
a wrong conviction as does perjury.
I. THE FACTS OF STRICKLER
A. The Charge
Thomas David Strickler was charged with capital murder in a
Virginia state court. He was convicted and sentenced to death. The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the
sentence.' Strickler sought habeas corpus relief in federal court,
alleging that the prosecution had failed to disclose important
exculpatory evidence.
The district court granted Strickler's
application for a writ of habeas corpus in an unreported opinion The
Fourth Circuit reversed and reinstated the conviction in another
unreported opinion." The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
ultimately affirmed the court of appeals in a 7-2 decision."
The homicide charge against Strickler was based on an incident that
occurred in January 1990. Leanne Whitlock, an African American
sophomore at James Madison University, was abducted from a local
shopping center, robbed, and murdered. 2 Strickler and Ronald
Henderson were both charged with the crimes, tried separately, and
convicted of all three offenses. 13 Henderson was convicted of first
degree murder, a non-capital crime, whereas Strickler was convicted
of capital murder and sentenced to death.'4
B.

The Importance of Anne Stoltzfus- Sole Eyewitness to the
Abduction
At the trials of Strickler and Henderson, a prosecution witness,
Anne Stoltzfus, testified in what Justice Stevens later described as
"vivid detail" about Whitlock's abduction. 5 Stoltzfus was the only
witness to the abduction.
8. See Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227,237 (Va. 1991).
9. See Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1941 n.1.
10. See id.
11. See Ud at 1940. Justice Stevens, viewed by many as the Court's most "liberal"
Justice, wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, joined in full. Justice Thomas joined in the

holding. Justices Kennedy and Souter joined that part of the Court's opinion holding
that the failure to disclose evidence did not affect the guilt/innocence determination,

but dissented from the holding that the undisclosed evidence did not require a new
sentencing hearing. See icL

12. See id- at 1941. The race of the victim was important because of witnesses who
testified to seeing a woman in the car at a later time. That woman was white.
13. See id
14. See id.
15. See id-
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Justice Stevens described the Stoltzfus testimony at Strickler's trial
at some length: 16 "Anne Stoltzfus testified that on two occasions on
January 5 she saw petitioner, Henderson, and a blonde girl inside the
Harrisonburg mall, and that she later witnessed their abduction of
Whitlock in the parking lot."' 7 Stoltzfus testified that she did not call
the police immediately following the incident, but that a week and a
half after the incident, she discussed the incident with classmates at
James Madison University, where both she and Whitlock were
students. One of these classmates called the police.'8 Stoltzfus told
the Virginia trial court that the next night a detective visited her. The
following morning she went to the police station and told her story to
Detective Claytor, who showed her photographs of possible suspects. 9
Stoltzfus identified Strickler and Henderson "'with absolute certainty'
but stated that she had a 'slight reservation about her identification of
the blonde woman."' 20
Stoltzfus testified that, at about 6 p.m. on January 5, she and her
14-year-old daughter were in the Music Land store in the mall to
purchase a compact disc. 21 She added that while she was waiting for
assistance from a store clerk, Strickler, whom she described as
"Mountain Man," and a blonde girl entered.' According to Stoltzfus,
Strickler seemed "revved up" and impatient, and this frightened
Stoltzfus and caused her to back up, bump into Henderson (whom she
called "Shy Guy"), and feel "something hard in the pocket of his
coat."'
Stoltzfus testified that she then left the store, but intended to return
later. She said she again encountered the threesome at about 6:45
p.m., while she was heading back toward Music Land: "'Shy Guy'
16. I include the entire description of her testimony because it is important in
evaluating the potential importance of the evidence that was not disclosed to the
defense.
17. Id. at 1943.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id. In a footnote, the Court stated:
She testified to their appearances in great detail. She stated that [Stoltzfus]
had "a kind of multi layer look." He wore a grey T-shirt with a Harley
Davidson insignia on it. The prosecutor showed Stoltzfus the shirt, stained
with blood and semen, that the police had discovered at petitioner's
mother's house. He asked if it were the same shirt she saw petitioner
wearing at the mall. She replied, "That could have been it." Henderson
"had either a white or light colored shirt, probably a short sleeve knit shirt
and his pants were neat. They weren't just old blue jeans. They may have
been new blue jeans or it may have just been more dressy slacks of some
sort." The woman "had blonde hair, it was kind of in a shaggy cut down the
back. She had blue eyes, she had a real sweet smile, kind of a small mouth.
Just a touch of freckles on her face."
Id. at 1943 n.5 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 1943.
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walking by himself, followed by the girl, and then 'Mountain Man'
yelling 'Donna, Donna, Donna."' 24 The girl allegedly bumped into
Stoltzfus and then asked for directions to the bus stop 5 The three
then left.
Stoltzfus explained to the jury that she first tried to follow the trio
because of her concern about Strickler's behavior, but she lost them
and then headed back to Music Land. 2 When the clerk did not
return, she and her daughter went to their car. While driving to
another store, they saw a shiny dark blue car. Stoltzfus said the driver
was "beautiful, well dressed and she was happy, she was singing." '
When the blue car stopped behind a minivan at a stop sign, Stoltzfus
allegedly saw petitioner for the third time. She testified:
'Mountain Man' came tearing out of the Mall entrance door and
went up to the driver of the van and ... was just really mad and ran
back and banged on back of the backside of the van and then went
back to the Mall entrance wall where 'Shy Guy' and 'Blonde Girl'
was [sic] standing... then we left [and before the van and a
white-pickup truck could turn] 'Mountain Man' came out
again ... 8
Stoltzfus then relayed facts about Strickler and his companions'
encounter with the victim in the parking lot in explicit detail: "After
first going to the passenger side of the pickup truck, [Strickler] came
back to the black girl's car, 'pounded on' the passenger window, shook
the car, yanked the door open and jumped in."' 9 Stoltzfus further
testified that "when Strickler motioned for 'Blonde Girl' and 'Shy
Guy' to get in, the driver stepped on the gas and 'just laid on the horn'
but she could not go because there were people walking in front of the
car."
The horn "blew a long time" and Strickler "started hitting
[Whitlock]... on the left shoulder, her right shoulder and then it
looked like to [Stoltzfus] that [Strickler] started hitting [Whitlock] on
the head and... [Stoltzfus] became concerned and upset."'31 At that
point, Stoltzfus said, she honked and beeped her horn and then the
driver stopped honking her horn and Strickler "stopped hitting her
and opened the [car] door again and the 'Blonde Girl' got in the back
and 'Shy Guy' followed and got behind him."'
Stoltzfus also testified that she "pulled her car up parallel to the
blue car, got out for a moment, got back in, and leaned over to ask
24.
25.
weave
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32

Id.
See id. "Stoltzfus stated that the girl caught a button in Stoltzfus's 'open
sweater, which is why I remember her attire."' Id. at 1943 n.6.
See id. at 1943.
Id.
d. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1943-44.
Id. at 1944.
Id.
Id.
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repeatedly if the other driver was O.K. The driver looked 'frozen'
and mouthed an inaudible response. 3 3 Stoltzfus claimed that she
"started to drive away and then realized 'the only word that it could
possibly be, was help.' The blue car then drove slowly around her,
went over the curb with its horn honking, and headed out of the
mall."'
Stoltzfus testified that she "briefly followed, told her
daughter to write the license number on a '3 x 4 [inch] index card,'35
and then left for home because she had an empty gas tank and 'three
kids at home waiting for supper."'36

While on the witness stand, Stoltzfus identified Whitlock from a
picture as the driver of the car and pointed to Strickler as "Mountain
Man." Stoltzfus emphatically denied that pretrial publicity about the
murder had influenced her identification. She explained: "[F]irst of
all, I have an exceptionally good memory. I had very close contact
with [petitioner] and he made an emotional impression with me
because of his behavior and I, he caught my attention and I paid
attention. So I have absolutely no doubt of my identification."37
C. Open File Discovery
The capital charge against Strickler was brought in Augusta
County, Virginia, where the prosecutor maintained an open file
discovery policy.3 As a result, Strickler's trial counsel had access to
all of the evidence in the prosecutor's file. With such access available
even without a discovery motion, defense counsel apparently saw no
need for a motion and filed no motion seeking discovery of
exculpatory evidence.39
D. Other Evidence of Guilt
There was substantial evidence of Strickler's guilt. Whitlock had
borrowed her boyfriend's blue Mercury Lynx and had planned to
meet him and return the car at a shopping mall in Harrisonburg,
Virginia, late in the afternoon of her abduction.40 Strickler's mother
testified that she drove Strickler and Henderson to Harrisonburg the
same day and that Strickler always carried a hunting knife with him.4'
A security guard saw Strickler and Henderson at the mall on the
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. "I said to my fourteen[-year-]old daughter, write down the license number,
you know, it was West Virginia, NKA 243 and I said help me to remember, 'No Kids
Alone 243,' and I said remember, 243 is my age." Id. at 1944 n.7 (citations omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1944.
38. See id. at 1945.
39. See id. at 1945-46.
40. See id. at 1941.
41. See id.
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afternoon of the abduction and kept the two men under observation,
because someone had reported that they were trying to steal a car in
the parking lot; but the guard lost sight of them at about 6:45 p.m.
At approximately 7:30 p.m., a witness saw the blue Lynx in Augusta
County about 25 miles from Harrisonburg and a short distance from
where the victim's body was found 3 This witness identified Strickler
as the driver of the car, and said that he "saw a white woman in the
front seat and another man in the back."'
Later that evening, Strickler and Henderson arrived at a bar where
they danced with several women. Henderson gave the victim's watch
to one of them.45 Four women from the bar testified at trial. Three
testified that they noticed nothing unusual about Strickler's
appearance, but one woman, Donna Kay Tudor, recalled seeing
"blood on his jeans and a cut on his knuckle."' Tudor left the bar
with the two men in search of marijuana, and Henderson was driving
the blue Lynx.47 Tudor testified to having "overheard a crude
conversation that could reasonably be interpreted as describing the
assault and murder of a black person with a 'rock crusher."'"
By four-thirty or five the next morning, Strickler and Tudor drove
Henderson to the apartment of Kenneth Workman, who testified
"that Henderson had blood on his pants and stated [that] he had
killed a black person."49 Strickler and Tudor drove to a motel and
later went to Virginia Beach for the rest of the week.sa Strickler gave
Tudor pearl earrings that the victim had been wearing when last seen,
and Tudor saw the victim's "driver's license and bank card in the
glove compartment of the car."' According to Tudor, Strickler
unsuccessfully tried to use the bank card in Virginia Beach. ,
Strickler and Tudor returned to Augusta County and abandoned
the car. The police found it and also found Strickler's and
Henderson's fingerprints inside and outside the car." They found
shoeprints matching Strickler's shoes, and a jacket inside the car that
contained identification papers belonging to Henderson.'
At
Strickler's mother's house, the police retrieved a bag that Tudor and
Strickler left there, which contained identification cards belonging to
42. See i.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1942.
46. Id

47. See idi
48. Id.
49. Id.

50. See id.
51. Id.
52 See id.
53. See id.

54. See id
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the victim as well as a tank top that had blood and semen on it. 5
The police responded to a tip from a farmer who, eight days after
the abduction, found Henderson's wallet and the victim's body near a
69-pound rock spotted with blood. 6 The "[f]orensic evidence
indicated that Whitlock's death was caused by 'multiple blunt force
injuries to the head' and that the rock was the likely murder
weapon.7
E. The Jury Instructionand Verdict
The Augusta County Circuit Court judge instructed the jury that
Strickler could be found guilty of capital murder if the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that he "'jointly participated in
the fatal beating and was an active and immediate participant in the
act or acts that caused the victim's death.' 58 Strickler was convicted
and the court sentenced him to death.
F. State Post-ConvictionProceedings
Strickler unsuccessfully appealed his sentence and conviction to the
Virginia Supreme Court. 9 The Augusta County Circuit Court
appointed new counsel to represent him in state habeas proceedings.6
This counsel argued ineffective assistance of counsel based in part on
the trial counsel's failure to file a motion for production of
exculpatory evidence. The prosecutor responded by relying on his
open file policy and claimed that the motion was unnecessary. 6' The
Augusta County court agreed and dismissed the petition. The
Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed.62
G. Federal Habeas Corpus and Discovery
It was the filing of Strickler's federal habeas corpus petition in the
Eastern District of Virginia that resulted in the entry of a sealed, ex
parte order granting Strickler's counsel the right to examine and copy
all of the police and prosecution files in the case.63 Counsel examined
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1946.
See id.
See id.
See id.

62. See Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648 (Va. 1995).
63. See Strickler, 119 S Ct. at 1947. The Supreme Court noted that the record
contained no explanation and no party could explain why the district court entered
this discovery order. The Fourth Circuit has held that district courts have no
authority to issue ex parte discovery orders in habeas corpus cases. See In re Pruett,
133 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court noted that it expressed no

opinion on the correctness of the Fourth Circuit's prior holding. See Strickler, 119 S.
Ct. at 1950 n.28.
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the files and discovered information
regarding Anne Stoltzfus that
64
previously had not been disclosed.
H. The Stoltzfus Information
The Stoltzfus information falls into two general categories: notes
taken by Detective Claytor during his interviews with Stoltzfus and
letters written by Stoltzfus to Claytor.
Because the contents of the newly disclosed information are critical
to the analysis that wil follow, each document that Strickler alleged
had been withheld is described below.
Exhibit 1 is a note handwritten by Detective Claytor after his first
interview with Stoltzfus on January 19, 1990, two weeks after the
crime.' According to the note, Stoltzfus could not identify the black
female victim. "The only person Stoltzfus could identify at this time
was the white female." 66
Exhibit 2 is a document prepared by Detective Claytor after
February 1. The document summarizes his interviews with Stoltzfus
conducted on January 19 and January 20, 1990.67 During those
interviews "she was not sure whether she could identify the white
males but felt sure she could identify the white female."'
Exhibit 3 is entitled "Observations" and includes a summary of the
abduction.69
Exhibit 4 is a letter to Claytor from Stoltzfus "to clarify some of my
confusion for you."70 The letter, which is dated three days after their
first interview, states that Stoltzfus had not remembered being at the
mall, but that her daughter had helped stimulate her memory!' Her
description of the abduction includes the comment:
I have a very vague memory that I'm not sure of. It seems as if the
wild guy that I saw had come running through the door and up to a
bus as the bus was pulling off.. . . Then the guy I saw came running
up to the black girl's window.? [sic] Were those 2 memories the
same person? 72
In a postscript she noted that her daughter "doesn't remember seeing
64. See Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
65. See id. at 1944.
66. Id.
67. See i. Justice Stevens observed that Exhibit 2 was consistent in part with
Exhibit 1, but Exhibit 2 omitted one important detail: "As the District Court pointed
out, however, [Exhibit 2] omits reference to the fact that Stoltzfus originally said that
she could not identify the victim-a fact recorded in his handwritten notes." Id. at
1944 n.9.
68. Id. at 1944.
69. See id
70. Id at 1944-45.
71. See id.
72- Id.
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the 3 people get into the black girl's car."73
Exhibit 5 is a note to Claytor entitled "My Impressions of 'The
Car." 74 This note contains three paragraphs describing the size of the
car and comparing it with Stoltzfus's Volkswagen Rabbit, but it does
not mention the license plate number that Stoltzfus vividly recalled at
the trial.75
Exhibit 6 is a note from Stoltzfus to Claytor dated January 25, 1990,
which states that after spending several hours with John Dean,
Whitlock's boyfriend, "looking at current photos," Stoltzfus had
identified Whitlock "beyond a shadow of a doubt. 7 6 In her note,
Stoltzfus did not claim any memory of details regarding the victim. It
was not until trial, as the district court noted, that Stoltzfus's
identification had expanded to include a description of Whitlock's
clothing and appearance as a college kid who was "singing" and
"happy."r
Exhibit 7 is a letter from Stoltzfus to Claytor, dated January 16,
1990, in which she thanks him for his "patience with my sometimes
' She states that if the student at school had not
muddled memories."78
called the police, "I never would have made any of the associations
that you helped me make.

79

In Exhibit 8, which is undated and summarizes the events described
in her trial testimony, Stoltzfus commented:
So where is the 3 x 4 card[.] ... It would have been very nice if I

could have remembered all this at the time and had simply gone to
the police with the information. But I totally wrote this off as a
trivial episode of college kids carrying on and proceeded with my
own full-time college load at JMU .... Monday, January 15th. I was
cleaning out my car and found the 3x4 card. I tore it into little
pieces and put it in the bottom of a trash bag.80
Justice Stevens observed that "It]here is a dispute between the
parties over whether petitioner's counsel saw Exhibits 2, 7, and 8
before trial," but "[t]he prosecuting attorney conceded that he himself
never saw Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 until long after petitioner's trial,
and they were not in the file he made available to petitioner."8 Even
though Strickler's lead defense counsel was certain that he had not
seen any of the documents, as was Henderson's trial counsel, the
prosecutor testified that three exhibits were in the open file. 82 A
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1945.
75. See id.

76. Id. Stoltzfus's trial testimony made no mention of her meeting with Dean.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.

82. See id. at 1945 n.11.
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second counsel for Strickler could not recall whether he had seen the
documents.83 Like the district court, Justice Stevens assumed that
Strickler and his counsel had not seen Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 prior to
or during his trial and that Exhibits 2,7, and 8 had been disclosed!,
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCLOSED TESTIMONY
A.

The Doubts Raised by the Documents

The importance of the documents regarding Stoltzfus is readily
apparent. This can be illustrated by a simple chart.
Stoltzfus Trial Testimony
1. The first time she went to the police
she identified Strickler and Henderson
"with absolute certainty."

Disclosed Documents
1. Exhibit 1. Detective Claytor's note
suggests that the first time Stoltzfus
went to the police she did not identify
either Strickler or Henderson.

2. The first time she went to the police 2. Exhibit 1. The first time she went to
she had a slight reservation about her the police the only person she could
identification of the blonde woman.
identify was the white female.
3. She and her 14-year-old daughter
were at the Music Land store in the
mall. While waiting for a clerk, she
saw Strickler (Mountain Man) with a
blonde girl. Strickler frightened her,
and she backed up and bumped into
Henderson (Shy Guy) and thought she
felt something hard in his coat pocket.

83. See id
84. See id at 1945.

3. Exhibits 1 and 3. She did not identify
either Strickler or Henderson when she
first met with the police. It seems
doubtful that she remembered this
confrontation at the Music Land store,
because she indicates in Exhibit 4 that
she did not remember being in the mall.
If she did not remember being in the
mall, it is hard to understand how she
could remember a specific event in the
mall.
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4. She saw a shiny dark blue car. The 4. Exhibit 1 and 6. The first time she
driver was "beautiful, well dressed and went to the police she could not identify
she was happy, she was singing."
the black female victim, let alone testify
about the victim's beauty or state of
mind. Exhibit 6 indicates that she spent
much time with the victim's boyfriend
before offering testimony about the
victim's state of mind.

5. Stoltzfus saw Strickler strike a van,
bang on the door of a pickup, and then
force his way into the victim's car and
motion for his friends to enter the car.

5. Exhibit 4. Stoltzfus's note to Claytor
states that her memory was vague, she
has a recolletion of seeing Strickler
approach a bus, not a van or pickup,
and was unsure whether he was the
same man who approached the victim's
car.

6. She saw Strickler striking the victim,
heard a horn blow for some time, and
then pulled her car up parallel to the
blue car, got out for a moment, got
back in, and leaned over to ask
repeatedly if the other driver was
"O.K." The driver looked "frozen"
and mouthed an inaudible response.

6. Exhibits 1 and 4. Despite claiming to
have leaned over toward the victim,
Stoltzfus was unable to identify the
victim at first and then wrote that her
memory was vague.

7. She was so concerned about the
victim as she realized that the victim
had asked for help and saw the
victim's car go over a curb that she
told her daughter to write down the
license number, "NKA 243," and said
to help her remember, "No Kids
Alone 243."

7. Exhibit 5. Her description of the car
contained no reference to a license
plate and no mention of telling her
daughter to write anything down.

8. Stoltzfus claimed to have an
exceptional memory, that pretrial
publicity did not influence her
testimony, and that she was certain of
her identification.

8. Exhibits 1, 4, and 5. Stoltzfus's
inability to identify Strickler when she
first came to the police, her
acknowledgment that she did not
remember being in the mall, and her
recognition that her memory was vague
make this highly unlikely.

2000]

PERJURY AND FALSE TESTIMONY

1549

This chart demonstrates that the undisclosed exhibits would cast
doubt in the minds of reasonable people as to the reliability of much
of what Stoltzfus relayed in her testimony in the Virginia trial court.
Her reliability is further undermined by what was contained in
Exhibits 7 and 8, which the district court and the Supreme Court
assumed were in the prosecutor's file and available to defense counsel.
Exhibit 7, Stoltzfus's January 16th letter to Detective Claytor, thanked
the detective for his "patience with my sometimes muddled
memories."' Stoltzfus candidly states that, if the student at school
had not called the police, "I never would have made any of the
associations that you helped me make."'
This letter is a strong
statement that Claytor influenced Stoltzfus's testimony as to "many of
the associations" she testified to without hesitation.
The undated Exhibit 8 refers to a 3 x 4 card, which, although not
definite, apparently is the first reference to the card on which she said
she asked her daughter to write down the license number. Because of
the absence of the date, it is not clear when Stoltzfus's recollection of
asking the daughter to write something down occurred. One clue,
however, is that the note stated the following: "Monday, January 15th.
I was cleaning out my car and found the 3 x 4 card. I tore it into little
pieces and put it in the bottom of a trash bag."' Putting Exhibits 7
and 8 together, we can fairly infer that by January 16th Stoltzfus had
formed many of the associations about which she would testify at trial.
At that time, she had found the 3 x 4 card, because she dated the
discovery one day earlier. Because she destroyed the card when she
found it, she must have believed that it was unimportant. Not only is
there no indication that the card contained a license number, but it is
also difficult to believe that Stoltzfus would have destroyed the card if
it did contain a license number.
We can infer much more than this from Exhibit 8. For example, we
can infer that, at the time she witnessed events, Stoltzfus did not
immediately realize that the victim was in trouble and was asking for
help. This seems readily apparent from Stoltzfus's written statement
at the time: "I totally wrote this off as a trivial episode of college kids
carrying on and proceeded with my own full-time college load at
JMU .... ."I It is reasonable to infer that no one who witnessed the
events to which Stoltzfus testified would have written the events off as
a "trivial episode of college kids carrying on" and gone back to her
routine. After all, Stoltzfus allegedly (1) saw a wild man force his way
into a car driven by a young female, (2) saw the wild man strike the
female, (3) heard a horn honking for a while, (4) stopped her car to
inquire into the safety of the female, (5) leaned into the car, (6) saw a
85. Id

86. IL
87. Id

88 Id
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"frozen" female who had been beaten by the wild man, (7) concluded
that the female had asked for help, (8) saw the wild man's friends get
in the back of the car, (9) saw the car driven wildly off, and (10) was
so concerned about what she had seen that she asked her daughter to
write down the license number while she herself created a mnemonic
device to remember the number.
B. The Totality of the Doubts
No one can know from reading the court opinions how the jurors
reacted to Stoltzfus's testimony. We cannot know if she appeared
confident, if she presented herself well to the jury, and if she was the
kind of witness that the jury would trust. We do know, however, that
the story Stoltzfus told at trial was highlighted by her apparent clear
recall of dramatic events. Her testimony refers to a wild man, to a
"frozen" victim asking for help, and to her own close attention to the
comings, goings, and actions of Strickler and his companions. Because
she was with her daughter at the mall, Stoltzfus's testimony might well
have been understood to imply that she was paying careful attention
to protect her own child. Because there was no other witness to
contradict her, Stoltzfus's apparent certainty and detailed recollection
might well have been considered reliable.
Yet, the documents (Claytor's notes and Stoltzfus's writings)
strongly suggest that when Stoltzfus first talked with Claytor, at the
time closest to the events about which she would testify, Stoltzfus
could not identify Strickler or Henderson and could identify only the
white female with them. By the time of trial, Stoltzfus was certain
about her identifications of the two men and less certain about the
white female, the only person Stoltzfus originally could identify. The
documents cast doubt on whether Stoltzfus really had any memory of
a license plate as opposed to having learned of it in conversations with
others as her memory was "refreshed." The documents indicate that
Stoltzfus herself understood that her memory had been a jumble that
became transformed over time as she dealt with Claytor and the
victim's boyfriend.
I have no doubt that, if I were asked to compare Stoltzfus's trial
testimony with the eight exhibits described above, I would wonder
whether the testimony was the product of genuine memory or
implanted knowledge. It is hard for me to understand how anyone
could feel comfortable accepting the testimony as genuine memory in
view of the memory problems Stoltzfus had and her statements about
events prior to meeting with Claytor and Dean, the victim's boyfriend.
Had any competent defense counsel actually understood the chain of
events that led Stoltzfus to the witness stand, she or he would have
explored the events and almost certainly would have raised doubts in
the mind of jurors as to the reliability of Stoltzfus's testimony.
Assuming that documents 2, 7, and 8 were available to the defense at
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trial, it nonetheless appears likely that the significance of these
documents would have been clearer had the defense known of
documents 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
C.

The Undisclosed Documents

From the commencement of federal habeas corpus proceedings
through the decision of the Supreme Court, no judge or justice
appears to have doubted that at least five documents were not
disclosed in the state trial and post-conviction proceeding.
Furthermore, no judge or justice has quarreled with the legal standard
to be used in a case like Strickler's. Since Brady v. Maryland,1 the
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that suppressing or withholding
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment 0 The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that due process is violated if the
material, exculpatory evidence is suppressed or withheld by a
prosecutor or by a police officer who fails to share it with a
prosecutor. 91 The Court also has clearly indicated that due process
can be violated when impeachment evidence is withheld.In Strickler, the Court declined to criticize defense counsel for not
finding the withheld documents. The Court found it reasonable for
defense counsel to rely upon the prosecutor's open file policy and to
assume that any documents there were the only documents that
existed. 93 The Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that,
because a federal district judge entered a discovery order that
ultimately forced disclosure of the withheld documents, this
demonstrated that a state court also would have done so had it been
asked. The Court reasoned that a state court might well be
unreceptive to a discovery motion based upon "[m]ere speculation
that some exculpatory material may have been withheld."
The
Court also might have observed that the Commonwealth won the
state post-conviction proceeding by defeating Strickler's ineffective
counsel claim with the argument that no discovery motion was
needed. In the end, a majority of the Supreme Court held that
Strickler "ha[d] satisfied two of the three components of a
constitutional violation under Brady: exculpatory evidence and
nondisclosure of this evidence by the prosecution." The Court also
89. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
90. See id. at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995) (holding that
failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence results in a violation of a defendant's
right to a fair trial); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (same); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103-07 (1976) (same).
91. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
92 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
93. See Strickler, 119 S.Ct. at 1949-50.
94. Id at 1950-51.
95. Id. at 1955.
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found cause for Strickler's failure to raise his claim regarding
suppressed documents during trial or on state post-conviction
review. The Court concluded, however, that there was a missing
ingredient of a successful Brady claim: to wit, "petitioner has not
shown that there is a reasonable probability that his conviction or
sentence would have been different had these materials been
disclosed."'
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in part and
dissented in part." Although he agreed with the majority that
Strickler failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would not
have been found guilty of capital murder had the material been
introduced at trial,99 Souter concluded that "there is a reasonable
probability (which I take to mean a significant possibility) that
disclosure of the Stoltzfus materials would have led the jury to
recommend life, not death."1"
There is no doubt that the crime charged was horrific. There is also
no doubt that there was substantial evidence that Strickler was guilty
of some form of homicide. There is, however, at least some reason to
doubt whether a jury would have convicted Strickler of capital murder
but for the Stoltzfus testimony. The trial judge instructed the jury that
it had to find not only that Strickler killed Leanne Whitlock, but that
he did so during the commission of a robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon, or during the commission of an abduction with intent
to extort money or a pecuniary benefit, or with the intent to defile, or
during the commission of or subsequent to a rape. 01 The trial judge
explained to the jury that it could convict Strickler as long as he was a
joint participant in the fatal beating. 1°2 The prosecutor's theory was
that the physical evidence pointed to a violent struggle that included
the victim and Strickler, but that none of her injuries would have
immobilized her until she was struck with a rock by one person while
being held down by another person.10 3 It is readily apparent that this
"theory" involves inferences that a jury might hesitate to make if it
had doubts about the way in which events unfolded and the roles of
the various participants. Assuming that Strickler struggled with the
victim, a rational juror could conclude that any struggle might have
resulted in her falling or being dazed. This would have enabled
anyone to hit her with a rock. Indeed, Henderson confessed to a

96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 1955-61 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 1956.

100. Id.

101. See id. at 1954 n.44.
102. See id. at 1953 n.39.
103. See id. at 1946 n.15 (quoting Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235

(Va. 1991)).
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friend that he killed the victim; ° he did not say that he and Strickler
did it. Donna Kay Tudor's husband testified that she told him that
she was present at the murder scene and that Strickler did not
participate in the murder." 5 Thus, the conclusion that Strickler was an
actual participant in the murder was not the only one that the jury
could have drawn.
It is equally true that a juror might have had doubts about whether
other elements of capital murder were proved. Strickler's mother
testified that he always carried a hunting knife. Although his mother
could not know whether Strickler actually had the knife with him at
any particular time, the fact that the victim was killed by being struck
by a large object, probably a rock, might have caused the jury to
wonder whether Strickler had a knife readily available to him at the
time of the killing and whether Strickler was the actual assailant.
There also was little testimony or evidence with respect to Strickler's
intent at the time he and the others kidnapped the victim. There was
evidence that the victim's tank top had semen stains and blood on it,
but no evidence as to whose blood or semen it was. Thus, it is
doubtful that rape by Strickler was proved." 6 Whether Strickler
intended to extort money or to defile was not the subject of direct
testimony.
This evidence helps to explain why a jury might have agreed with
the prosecution's theory, but this evidence alone might have left the
jury with a reasonable doubt about capital murder and doubts about
the penalty the jurors should recommend. The more the jurors
believed that Strickler was "in control" of events, the more likely they
were to believe the prosecutor's theory. It was Stoltzfus more than
any other witness who established for the prosecution the fact of
Strickler's control. It was Stoltzfus who painted the picture of a wild
man running amuck both inside and outside the mall, forcing his way
into the victim's car, beating the victim, and inviting his companions
into the car. It is no stretch of imagination to conclude that the jury
relied upon Stoltzfus, because the trial judge clearly did in accepting
the jury's recommendation as to sentencing. The judge said that,
among the facts supporting the jury's verdict, the first was that
Strickler was in control. The first evidence the judge cited was
Strickler's "control at the shopping center in Harrisonburg."'0
Stoltzfus was the only witness who could have established this fact.
Take it away and the remainder of the reasoning about control is
questionable.
104. See idat 1942.
105. See id. at 1943.
106. See id. at 1942. It is unclear from the evidence whether the government made
any attempt to connect semen evidence to the kidnapping or assault, or to any

particular person.
107. Id. at 1953 n.38.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, I have little doubt that the
suppression of the Stoltzfus evidence might well have affected the
jury's decision to convict Strickler of capital murder as opposed to
non-capital murder, and might well have resulted in the death
sentence that the jury recommended and the trial judge imposed. But
I write here not simply to disagree with the Supreme Court (all nine
Justices) who found that Stoltzfus's testimony, even if it had been
entirely discredited, would almost certainly have had no impact on the
jury as it deliberated the charge of capital murder. 108 Nor do I write to
disagree with the seven Justices who believed that the jury would not
have found the withheld evidence important in deciding on the
sentence to be imposed. Each reader of the Supreme Court opinion
and this Article can reach his or her own opinion as to the likely affect
upon a jury of discovering that Stoltzfus might not actually have
remembered any of the important facts about which she testified. My
goal is not to reargue the Strickler case. It is, rather, to talk about
perjury, false testimony, and the Supreme Court's incredible
willingness to distinguish the two and to perpetuate injustice rather
than to require the government to offer truthful testimony.
III. PERJURY AND FALSE TESTIMONY

A. Brady Violations Versus Use of False Testimony; Establishinga
Rule for the Knowing Use of False or Perjured Testimony
The most famous of the Supreme Court's cases concerning a
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory information is Brady v.
Maryland.°9 Long before Brady, however, the Supreme Court
established that a prosecutor who knowingly uses false or perjured
testimony denies a defendant due process.
The first case to hold that a prosecutor who knowingly used false or
perjured testimony denied a defendant due process was Mooney v.
Holohan.11° In a habeas corpus regime that was very similar to
today's,"' Mooney sought federal habeas corpus relief from his
murder conviction and death sentence. The district court dismissed
Mooney's petition on the ground that he had not adequately
exhausted state remedies." 2 The court of appeals denied leave to
appeal. 13 Mooney sought leave to file a habeas petition in the United
States Supreme Court in order to raise his claim that the State of
108. See id. at 1953.
109. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
110. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
111. The new habeas corpus regime was established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (Supp. H 1999) (habeas corpus provisions)).
112. See Mooney v. Holohan, 7 F. Supp. 385,388 (N.D. Cal. 1934).
113. See In re Mooney, 72 F.2d 503,509 (9th Cir. 1934).
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California denied him due process by knowingly using perjured
testimony to convict him and by suppressing evidence that would have
impeached the perjured testimony.' In response to an order to show
cause issued by the Court, the Attorney General of California
essentially demurred by failing to challenge Mooney's factual
allegations and arguing as a matter of law that the actions or
omissions of a prosecutor can never deprive a defendant of due
process (a proposition that is startling to think about, but that was
boldly put to the Court).1 The Supreme Court rejected the argument
and set forth its own regard for the due process clause.
The Court reasoned that due process "is a requirement that cannot
be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has
contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial[,]" when the trial
is simply the means through which the state deprives a defendant of
liberty through a "deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.""'
The Court
further stated that such a contrivance by a state to procure the
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as "inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a similar
result by intimidation.""' 7 The Court ultimately denied Mooney leave
to file his petition because he had not presented his claim to the
California state courts, which, the Court found,8 would not have
tolerated a violation like the one Mooney alleged."1
The Court cited Mooney seven years later in Pyle v. Kansas."' Pyle
was convicted in state court of murder and robbery and sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder. He made allegations similar to
those made by Mooney, which included knowing use of perjured
testimony and suppression of favorable defense evidence. 2Uj Pyle's
suppression claim involved allegations that the state used coercion
and threats to prevent witnesses from testifying for the defense. In
remanding the case, the Supreme Court reasoned:
Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth
allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony,
knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and
from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of
evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if
proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 109-10.
See iL at 111-12.
Id. at 112.
Id
See iL at 113-15.
317 U.S. 213 (1942).
See id at 213-14.
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B.

Applying the Rule

Mooney and Pyle stated legal principles, but they provided no relief
to either habeas petitioner. Alcorta v. Texas 122 demonstrated how
these principles required the reversal of an improperly obtained
conviction. Alcorta was charged with first degree murder in the
killing of his wife. He admitted the murder but claimed heat of
passion in an effort to reduce the degree of culpability, urging that the
killing occurred when he found his wife kissing another man in a car at
night." The jury rejected the heat of passion claim and Alcorta was
convicted and sentenced to death. 2 4
The key witness, the only eyewitness other than Alcorta, was
Castilleja, the man who Alcorta claimed was kissing his wife. In
response to inquiries by the prosecutor on direct examination about
his relationship with the petitioner's wife, Castilleja said "that he had
simply driven her home from work a couple of times, and in substance
testified that his relationship with her had been nothing more than a
casual friendship.""l
At the end of the direct examination, the
prosecutor engaged in the following exchange with the witness:
Q.Natividad [Castilleja], were you in love with Herlinda?
A. No.
Q. Was she in love with you?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever talked about love?
A. No.
Q. Had you ever had any dates with her other than to take her
home?
A. No. Well, just when I brought her from there.
Q. Just when
you brought her from work?
126
A. Yes.

Castilleja was called to testify during a habeas corpus hearing. At
the hearing, he confessed that he had sexual intercourse with
Alcorta's wife five or six times shortly before her death. Moreover,
Castilleja testified that he told the prosecutor about the intercourse
before trial, and the prosecutor instructed him that he should not
volunteer any information about such intercourse, but, if specifically
asked about it, to answer truthfully. 2 7 The prosecutor confirmed

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 215-16 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)).
355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam).
See id. at 28-29.
See id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
See id. at 30-31.
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this. 128 Notwithstanding this testimony, the trial judge denied habeas
corpus relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 9
The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion found the case to be
easily decided under Mooney and Pyle. After citing both cases, the
Court reasoned as follows:
It cannot seriously be disputed that Castilleja's testimony, taken as a
whole, gave the jury the false impression that his relationship with
petitioner's wife was nothing more than that of casual friendship.
This testimony was elicited by the prosecutor who knew of the illicit
intercourse between Castileja and petitioner's wife.1
The Court found that Castilleja's testimony was prejudicial to
Alcorta because it tended to refute his claim that he had adequate
cause for a surge of "sudden passion" inwhich he killed his wife. If
Castilleja's relationship with Alcorta's wife had been truthfully
portrayed to the jury, explained the Court, it would have impeached
Castilleja's credibility and corroborated Alcorta's contention that he
had found his wife embracing the other man. If the jury had accepted
Alcorta's defense, as it could have "if Castilleja had not been allowed
to testify falsely, to the knowledge of the prosecutor, [Alcorta's]
offense would have been reduced to 'murder without malice'
precluding the death penalty [that was then] imposed upon him."''
For me, the importance of the case is that the Supreme Court knew
false testimony when it saw it. It did not analyze whether this was
actually perjury. It did not focus on minor details. Did the
intercourse occur on dates? Did Castilleja and Alcorta's wife go on
real dates? The Court did not care about such questions or their
answers because it understood that the prosecutor's questioning of the
witness was plainly intended to mislead the jury. Castilleja might well
have been truthful when he said he was not in love with Alcorta's
wife, she was not in love with Castilleja, and they never talked about
love. The thrust of the testimony, however, was intended to
communicate that the relationship was not about sex, even though the
word "love" was used. This testimony was false testimony according
12
to nine Justices, and it required reversal of Alcorta's conviction.
Just two years later, the Court reversed another conviction in
Napue v. Illinois.3 This time, Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion
for another unanimous Court. Napue, like Alcorta, had been
convicted of murder in state court. Napue and Hamer were two of
four men charged with the attempted armed robbery of a cocktail
lounge that led to a shootout in which one robber and an off-duty
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 31.
See ihL
Id.
Id. at 31-32.

132 See id. at 32.

133. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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police officer were killed. 131 Hamer, who had been seriously wounded
in the shootout, was charged with murdering the police officer,
convicted, and sentenced to 199 years. Another participant, Poe, was
tried separately, convicted, and sentenced to death.
Hamer did not
testify in Poe's trial, but was the key witness against Napue.
Eyewitness testimony was not strong, and that made Hamer's
testimony critical. 136 The prosecutor elicited the following testimony
from Hamer on direct examination:
Q. Did anybody give you a reward or promise you a reward for
testifying?
A. There ain't nobody promised me anything.37
On redirect examination the prosecutor elicited consistent testimony:
Q. [by the Assistant State's Attorney] Have I promised you that I
would recommend
any reduction of sentence to anybody?
138
A. You did not.

After another prosecutor convicted a fifth participant, the driver of
the getaway car in the attempted robbery, the original prosecutor filed
a petition for a writ of error coram nobis on Hamer's behalf. The
prosecutor alleged that he had promised Hamer that a
recommendation for a reduction of his sentence would be made if he
testified against Napue and that such a reduction would be effectuated
1 39
"if possible.'
Napue learned of Hamer's coram nobis petition and filed his own
post-conviction petition. A hearing was held in the state trial court,
and the former prosecutor changed his version of the facts. This time,
the former prosecutor testified that he had promised to help Hamer
only if he determined that Hamer's story "'about being a reluctant
participant' in the robbery was borne out, and not merely if Hamer
would testify at [Napue's] trial." 140 The former prosecutor testified
that he probably had exaggerated his commitment to Hamer in filing
the coram nobis petition on Hamer's behalf.' The trial court denied
Napue relief in reliance on the attorney's testimony.
Napue appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. That court affirmed
the denial of relief, but rejected the reasoning of the trial court. 42 The
state supreme court agreed with Napue that the former prosecuting
attorney had promised Hamer consideration if he would testify at
Napue's trial and that Hamer had lied in denying that he had been
134. See id. at 265-66.
135. See id. at 265.
136. See id. at 265-66.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 267 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 266-67.
Id.
See id.
See Napue v. Illinois, 150 N.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ill. 1958).
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promised consideration. The court held, however, that Napue was not
prejudiced and was not entitled to relief because the jury had already
been told that someone, whom Hamer had previously identified as a
public defender, "'was going to do what he could"' to help Hamer and
43
that this person "'was trying to get something did [sic]"' for Hamer.
In rejecting the state supreme court's reasoning, Chief Justice

Warren described the governing law as: "[A] conviction obtained
through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of
the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment,"'' and -[tihe
same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false

evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears."' 45 The Chief
Justice expanded the principle previously established as he wrote,
"[t]he principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence,
including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in
any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely
because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the
witness[,]" and "[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability
143. Napue, 360 U.S. at 268. The Illinois Supreme Court had relied upon the
following testimony of Hamer at Napue's trial:
Q. [on cross-examination] And didn't you tell him [one of Napue's
attorneys] that you wouldn't testify in this case unless you got some
consideration for it?
Yes, I did; I told him that.
A.
Q. What are you sentenced for?
A. One Hundred and Ninety-Nine Years.
Q. You hope to have that reduced, don't you?
A. Well, if anybody would help me or do anything for me, why certainly I
would.
Q. Weren't you expecting that when you came here today?
A. There haven't no one told me anything, no more than the lawyer. The
lawyer come in and talked to me a while ago and said he was going to do
what he could.
Q. Which lawyer was that?
A. I don't know; it was a Public Defender. I don't see him in here.
Q. You mean he was from the Public Defender's office?
A. I imagine that is where he was from, I don't know.
Q. And he was the one who told you that?
A. Yes, he told me he was trying to get something did for me.
Q. .. And he told you he was going to do something for you?
A. He said he was going to try to.
Q. And you told them [police officers] you would [testify at the trial of
Napue] but you expected some consideration for it?
A. I asked them was there any chance of me getting any. The man told me
he didn't know, that he couldn't promise me anything.
Q. Then you spoke to a lawyer today who said he would try to get your time
cut?
A. That was this Public Defender. I don't even know his name....
Id. at 268 n.3.
144. Id-at 269 (citing Mooney and Pyle as well as other cases).
145. Id. (citing Alcorta as well as other cases).
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of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness
46
in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.'
The Chief Justice rejected the argument that Napue was not
prejudiced because Hamer testified that he sought help from the
public defender:
Had the jury been apprised of the true facts.., it might well have
concluded that Hamer had fabricated testimony in order to curry the
favor of the very representative of the State who was prosecuting
the case in which Hamer was testifying, for Hamer might have
believed that such a representative was in a position to implement
47
(as he ultimately attempted to do) any promise of consideration.
Chief Justice Warren found support for his reasoning in the
prosecutor's redirect examination in which he ended by eliciting
testimony that
Hamer had not been promised anything by the
148
prosecutor.

It is evident that no Justice believed it was necessary to determine
whether Napue proved all elements of perjury or whether Hamer
believed he was testifying falsely when he assisted the government in
the Napue prosecution. 49 It was enough for the Court that the
prosecutor elicited testimony that misled the jury about an important
fact. 5 This was not tolerable under the Due Process Clause for any
Justice in 1959.
C. Expanding the Rule
In Giglio v. United States, another Chief Justice, Warren Burger,
wrote for a unanimous Court 51 reversing a conviction for passing
forged money orders. 5 ' The key witness against Giglio was Robert
Taliento, Giglio's alleged co-conspirator and the only witness who
could link Giglio with the crime.
Taliento worked at the
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. as a teller and cashed several
forged money orders.1 53 When questioned by the FBI, Taliento
confessed that he had provided Giglio with a signature card that
Giglio used to forge $2300 in money orders, which Taliento then
146. Id.
147. Id. at 270.
148. See id. at 270-71.

149. It is possible that Napue believed he was testifying honestly because he did not
believe that this prosecutor made any promise or that any promise had been made to
make a recommendation to "anyone in particular." In other words, there might have
been a technical way of interpreting the questions and answers to make them
misleading and thus a distortion of the truth without making them perjury.
150. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70 (citation omitted).
151. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
152. See 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
153. See id. at 151.
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processed through the bank's regular channels.'
Taliento claimed that Giglio was the instigator of the crime.
Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined. Part of the examination
proceeded as follows:
Q. [Counsel.] Did anybody tell you at any time that if you implicated
somebody else in this case that you yourself would not be
prosecuted?
A. [Taliento.] Nobody told me I wouldn't be prosecuted.
Q. They told you you might not be prosecuted?

A. I believe I still could be prosecuted.
Q. Were you ever arrested in this case or charged with anything in
connection with these money orders that you testified to?
A. Not at that particular time.
Q. To this date, have you been charged with any crime?
A. Not that I know of, unless they are still going to prosecute.!55
The prosecutor relied upon this testimony in his closing argumentY
Giglio filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. The government filed an affidavit opposing the motion in
which it admitted that Taliento was promised by Assistant United
States Attorney DiPaola, that he would not be prosecuted if he
testified before the grand jury and at trial." This particular assistant
presented the evidence to the grand jury but did not try the case in the
district court. Instead, another assistant, Golden, tried the case.
Golden filed his own affidavit in response to the motion stating that
DiPaola promised him before the trial that no offer of immunity had
been extended to Taliento. 58 Thus, Golden could not dispute that
DiPaola may have made a representation to Taliento, but Golden
could swear that he had no knowledge of the representation. "The
United States Attorney, Hoey, filed an affidavit stating that he had
personally consulted with Taliento and his attorney shortly before
trial...." 59 Hoey's affidavit also could not rebut DiPaolo's evidence,
but it emphasized that Taliento was told that he would be prosecuted
unless he testified and that, if he did testify, he would have to rely on
the "'good judgment and conscience of the Government' as to
whether he would be prosecuted."" °
Chief Justice Burger found that it did not matter that the prosecutor
who made the promise to Taliento was not the prosecutor who tried
the case or that the prosecutor who tried the case did not know of the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See iU.
Id at 151-52.
See id. at 152.
See id.
See id
Id at 152-53.
Id at 153.
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I did
i not matter whether the prosecutor who made the
promise. 161 It
promise deliberately or negligently failed to disclose it: "[N]either
DiPaola's authority nor his failure to inform his superiors or his
associates is controlling.... [W]hether the nondisclosure was a result
of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor. The
prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
Government.' 161 Although the Chief Justice indicated that not every
failure to disclose material in a prosecutor's file required reversal of a
conviction, this one did because the Government's case depended
almost entirely on Taliento's testimony and "without it there could
have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the
jury."' 63 According to the Court, an important issue in the case was
Taliento's credibility as a witness. Evidence of any agreement
regarding future prosecution was relevant to Taliento's credibility and
"the jury was entitled to know of it."'" Based on the due process
requirements enumerated in Napue, the Court reversed Giglio's
conviction and remanded the case. 65
The Chief Justice's emphasis on Napue is telling. It indicates the
view of seven Justices that the government presented false testimony.
Chief Justice Burger did not find it necessary to decide whether this
was perjury on Taliento's part. 166 It could not have been subornation
of perjury or knowing presentation of false testimony by the
prosecutor who tried the case if his affidavit is taken as true. Giglio
reinforces the notion that presentation of false testimony that creates
a false impression of important facts violates due process.
The Court decided Giglio without a dissent. Yet, the same term, it
held 5-4, in Moore v. Illinois,67 that a defendant was not denied due
process as a result of the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence or to
correct testimony."6 The facts of the case are complicated and need
not be recited here. It should suffice to say that Moore was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death.169 Powell was one of the witnesses
to the shooting that occurred in the victim's bar.171 Powell claimed to
have seen Moore enter the bar, but the police had a statement by
161. See id.
162. Id. at 154.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 155.
165. See id. at 154-55.
166. See id. Taliento might have thought that the United States Attorney's
statement to him and to defense counsel overrode and negated any promise. He
might have forgotten the original promise. Or, he might have understood the promise
differently from the assistant who made it.
167. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
168. See id. at 799-800.
169. The case was decided the same day as Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and the Court invalidated the death penalty imposed upon Moore. See Moore, 408
U.S. at 800.
170. See Moore, 408 U.S. at 790.
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another witness that included a diagram that arguably placed Powell
in a different position than he claimed to be.'7' Another witness,
Sanders, claimed to have been present with a man known as "Slick,"
whom Sanders identified as Moore, and who, Sanders claimed, made
mention of "'open season on bartenders' or something to that
effect. 72 Sanders gave a statement to the police in which he stated
that he met Slick some six months before the critical post-murder
conversation. 173 This would not have been possible if Moore were
actually the same person as Slick, because Moore was then in federal
prison.174 Moore alleged that the prosecution permitted false
testimony at trial to go uncorrected.
Although the Justices divided 5-4, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion and Justice Marshall's opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, agreed on an important proposition: The
government cannot permit false testimony to stand simply because
police officers, rather than prosecutors, have possession of crucial
facts. Justice Marshall was explicit on the matter: "When the State
possesses information that might well exonerate a defendant in a
criminal case, it has an affirmative duty to disclose that information.
While frivolous information and useless leads can be ignored, if
evidence is clearly relevant and helpful to the defense, it must be
disclosed."175 Marshall explained that the prosecutor is responsible
for those persons directly assisting him in bringing an accused to
justice and that the burden of correcting false testimony and sharing
exculpatory evidence is the essence of due process of law: "It is the
State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that the trial
is fair."' 76

Justice Blackmun's majority opinion was less clear. He wrote that
"[w]e know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution
make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police
investigatory work on a case." 1" This might seem to indicate that the
prosecutor is relieved from responsibility for the conduct of the police.
However, Justice Blackmun emphasized that Sanders was wrong
about the date, not about meeting with Moore and hearing Moore's
comment. It would have been relatively simple for Justice Blackmun
to write that a prosecutor is not responsible for information in the
hands of the police if that were the majority's position. Rather than
doing so, he analyzed the importance of the information that was not
disclosed to Moore and determined that it was not material.178
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id at 796-97.
Id at 789.
See id at 791.
See iL at 791-92.
Id. at 809 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 810 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 795.
Justice Marshall and the other dissenters disagreed. See id. at 800-10. I was a
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As for the diagram that supposedly showed that Powell's testimony
was untrue, Justice Blackmun concluded that "[w]e are not persuaded
that the diagram shows that Powell's testimony was false."17 9 The

majority reasoned that Powell could have been looking in the
direction he said he was looking regardless of where he might have
been seated. 18° A fair inference from the majority opinion is that the
majority, like the dissenters, would have found a violation of Napue if
the police had a record that showed that a witness's testimony was
false with respect to something important like an eyewitness
identification.
Although the Supreme Court later made it clear in Kyles v.
Whitley 8 1 that a prosecutor is responsible for disclosing to a defendant
all exculpatory information known to government actors, including
the police, the Court has never explicitly returned to the Mooney line
of cases to analyze whether use by the government of testimony
known to be false by the police is a due process violation even if the
prosecutor does not know it is false. The Mooney line of cases has
been "lost" for the most part since the Supreme Court's decision in
Brady v. Maryland."8
IV. BRADY AND ITS PROGENY

A. Brady v. Maryland
We now return to the most famous of the Supreme Court's cases on
the duty of the prosecution to disclose evidence to the defense, Brady
v. Maryland."s3 The defendants, Brady and Boblit, were both charged
with murder and tried separately. Brady was tried first, conceded
participation in the murder, and claimed that Boblit actually did the
killing. 84 Defense counsel requested access to statements by Boblit.
The prosecution provided the defense with some statements but
withheld a statement in which Boblit admitted the killing. 185 In his
summation, defense counsel admitted that Brady was guilty of murder
in the first degree but asked the jury to return that verdict "'without

law clerk for Justice Marshall when the case was decided, and I have not changed my
view that the dissenters had the better of the argument. The majority seemed
surprisingly confident that they knew that a witness who was wrong about a date and
who indicated that Moore looked different from the man who had made the

statement was undoubtedly correct in identifying Moore and wrong only about when
he first met Moore.
179. Id. at 798.

180. See id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

514 U.S. 419,437-38 (1995).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id.
See id. at 84.
See id.
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capital punishment."' 186
When Brady discovered the withheld statement, he filed a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that he had been denied due process and was
entitled to a new trial.'1 The United States Supreme Court agreed.
Justice Douglas'm recognized that the Court's ruling that failure to
disclose Boblit's confession was "an extension of Mooney v. Holohan,
where the Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates
due process."'"
The Court's holding was as follows:
"[T]he
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."' 90 Douglas continued, "The principle of
Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials
are fair ...."I"'Mooney, Pyle, Alcorta, and Napue were not sufficient
to provide Brady relief, because there was no presentation of false
testimony. Instead, the prosecution withheld evidence that might
have caused the jury to return a different verdict with respect to
punishment.19 Justice Douglas and the Brady Court understood that
Brady expanded the legal principle that had been declared in Mooney
in 1935.
The Supreme Court discussed Brady as well as Napue in Giglio v.
United States"9s and Moore v. Illinois."9 However, both of those cases
involved allegations of the use of false testimony, albeit in a context in
which it seemed that the prosecutor trying each case was unaware of
186. 1&
187. See Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167,172 (Md. 1961).

188.
Justice
189.
190.

The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Douglas and announced by
Brennan.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citation omitted).
Id. at 87.

19L Id. Douglas further opined:

[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice
states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: 'The United States
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.' A
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if
made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor
in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
standards of justice, even though, as in the present case, his action is not 'the
result of guile'....
Id. at 87-88 (footnote omitted).
192. Justice White wrote a separate opinion. See id. at 91-92. Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Black, dissented. See id. at 92-95. All three believed it was not necessary to
decide the broad due process question.
193. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

194. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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the possibility that the testimony was false. Thus, neither of these
cases was a pure Brady case.
B. IrreparablyConfusing the State of the Law
The Supreme Court decided a pure Brady case in United States v.
Agurs. 95 Agurs was convicted of second degree murder as a result of
stabbing to death a man with whom she had registered in a motel as
husband and wife. 196 Agurs claimed self-defense, but the jury rejected
the claim. Three months after the jury returned its verdict, Agurs
sought a new trial on the ground that the victim had a criminal record
that would have further evidenced his violent character and the
prosecutor failed to disclose the record to the defense. 197 Agurs
alleged that a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit established that evidence of the
victim's criminal record for violence was admissible even if not known
to a defendant claiming self-defense.1 98
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court and
mischaracterized the Supreme Court's prior decisions discussed
above. According to Stevens, "[t]he rule of Brady v. Maryland
arguably applies in three quite different situations. Each involves the
discovery, after trial, of information which
had been known to the
199
prosecution but unknown to the defense.
Stevens's first Brady situation was "typified by Mooney v.
Holohan200 [and occurs when] the undisclosed evidence demonstrates
that the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that the
prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury. ' 20 1 Stevens
rewrote the history of Supreme Court precedent in the realm of false
testimony and perjury: "In a series of [cases following Mooney,] the
Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood ''that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury. 120
We have already seen, however, that the Supreme Court's earlier
decisions did not turn on the niceties of perjury law. Those decisions
condemned the knowing use of false testimony, even where it was not
clear that the witness knew the testimony was false or where the
literal testimony technically might have been true, and also where the
195.
196.
197.
198.

427 U.S. 97 (1976).
See id. at 98-99.
See id. at 100.
See id. at 100-01 (citing United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 434 (D.C. Cir.

1972)).
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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trial prosecutor was unaware that the testimony was false. Agurs
reduced the Mooney-Alcorta-Napue line of cases to the "knowing use
of perjured testimony," which considerably narrowed those cases2
Having done the narrowing, Justice Stevens then stated that in these
cases "the Court ha[d] applied a strict standard of materiality, not just
because they involve[d] prosecutorial misconduct, but more
importantly because they involve[d] a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process. '
The statement is true but misleading: Mooney and Pyle initiated the
line of cases that gave rise to Alcorta and Napue; the first two cases
involved alleged perjury and withholding of evidenceY 5 The latter
No Justice
cases involved false testimony rather than perjury.73
overtly acknowledged the blow that Justice Stevens dealt to precedent
in Agurs.
The second Brady situation that Justice Stevens identified in Agurs
was illustrated by Brady, itself. Looking back at Brady, where the
defense made a pretrial request for specific evidence, Justice Stevens
observed that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that
implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the
suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial."' ,,
Justice Stevens emphasized that Brady had specifically requested
Boblit's statements, leaving no doubt as to the discovery he sought
and that, "[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant
request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever,
excusable."'
Justice Stevens opined that a third Brady situation occurs when a
defendant makes no specific request or makes a general request that
does not indicate what specific material is being sought. 9 Justice
Stevens observed that "this Court has not yet decided whether the
prosecutor has any obligation to provide defense counsel with
exculpatory information when no request has been made." 10 He then
analyzed no request and general request cases.
In many cases, exculpatory information in the possession of the
prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel. In such a situation, a
defense counsel may make no request at all, or ask for "all Brady
material" or for "anything exculpatory." In Agurs, Justice Stevens
reasoned that any duty to respond to such a general request must
"derive from the obviously exculpatory character" of certain evidence
203. See id. at 103-04.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 104.
See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-50 and accompanying text.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 106.
See id.
Id.
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possessed by the prosecutor.n Stevens continued, however, that if
the evidence is "so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce," that duty should
arise even if no request has been made.
Stevens concluded that
there is no significant difference between cases in which there has
been merely a general request for exculpatory matter
and cases, such
213
as Agurs, in which there has been no request at all.
Justice Stevens further reasoned that a prosecutor is not
constitutionally required to turn the government's entire file over to a
defendant, but a prosecutor will deny a defendant due process by
failing to make a disclosure under circumstances in which "his
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial. ' 214 Justice Stevens predicted that,
"[b]ecause we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and
because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be
predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.1 25
Departing from the earlier line of cases involving false testimony in
which knowledge mattered greatly, Justice Stevens wrote in Agurs
that the good or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant: 2 6 "If
evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he should be
presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually
overlooked it.' '21 7 Conversely, Stevens reasoned, if evidence actually
has no probative significance at all, no purpose would be served by
requiring a new trial simply because "an inept prosecutor incorrectly
believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense.
If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is
because of the
character of the evidence, not the character of the
'218
prosecutor.
Justice Stevens cited Giglio as authority for this proposition. This is
unfortunate because Giglio involved false testimony. There, the
Court held the prosecutor responsible for false testimony
notwithstanding that another prosecutor who made promises to a key
witness did not reveal them. 219 In short, the Giglio Court held that the
government's knowledge was to be examined as a whole, at least as
211. Id. at 107
212. Id.
213. See id. at 106-07. According to Stevens, the third situation in which the Brady
rule arguably applies, typified by Agurs, therefore embraces the case in which only a
general request for "Brady material" has been made. See id.
214. Id. at 108.
215. Id.
216. "Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral
culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor." Id. at 110.
217. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
218. Id. at 110.
219. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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far as prosecutors were concerned. Thus, if the government presented
testimony that any of its prosecutors knew was false, there was a due
Giglio involved fault on the part of the
process violation.'
government that resulted in the presentation of false testimony.21
Thus, it did not support Justice Stevens's reasoning.
In Agurs, the Court held that prosecutors need not turn over their
entire files to defendants, that some exculpatory evidence must be
disclosed, and that prosecutorial culpability is unimportant.' Justice
Stevens then created a test to assess whether a due process violation
has occurred in his third Brady situation: If the omitted evidence,
when evaluated in the context of the entire record, "creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed....

If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt

whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial."'
Justice Stevens applied this test to Agur's claim and found that the
failure to disclose the victim's prior record did not deny her due
process 2 4 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.
Justice Marshall argued that the majority's approach provided the
wrong incentives for prosecutorial disclosure:
Under today's ruling, if the prosecution has not made knowing use
of perjury, and if the defense has not made a specific request for an
item of information, the defendant is entitled to a new trial only if
the withheld evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt
in the judge's mind. With all respect, this rule is completely at odds
with the overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending to
show innocence is brought to the jury's attention. The rule creates
little, if any, incentive for the prosecutor conscientiously to
determine whether his files contain evidence helpful to the defense.
Indeed, the rule reinforces the natural tendency of the prosecutor to
overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and creates an incentive
for the prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in favor of
concealment.
Justice Marshall intepreted lower court opinions as adopting a
standard preferable to the majority's: "If there is a significant chance
that the withheld evidence, developed by skilled counsel, would have
induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a
conviction, then the judgment of conviction must be set aside." Z6
Justice Marshall did not challenge the majority's treatment of
earlier precedents. Although he argued with respect to Napue and
220. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13.
Id (footnote omitted).
See id. at 113-14.
Id. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Giglio that "surely the results in those cases, and the standards
applied, would have been no different if perjury had not been
involved," 7 he failed completely to recognize that it is not clear that
there was perjury in those cases. Nor did he look back to the cases
that led to those decisions, which would have indicated that the Agurs
majority had substantially narrowed the principle that Alcorta and
Napue had established as they built upon the Mooney and Pyle
foundation.
C. Refining the Brady Test and Cutting Ties with the Past
In United States v. BagleyP Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court
and collapsed Justice Stevens's three categories into two. Bagley was
indicted on charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms
statutes. He filed a pretrial discovery motion requesting, inter alia,
"any deals, promises or inducements made to [Government] witnesses
in exchange for their testimony. '229 In response, the government
disclosed no arrangements with witnesses. 230 The government knew
that its two principal witnesses had assisted the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") in conducting an undercover
investigation of Bagley. 1 It produced for the defense signed
affidavits by these witnesses. These affidavits set forth their
undercover dealing with Bagley and concluded with statements that
the affidavits were made without any threats or rewards or promises
of reward. 2 Bagley waived his right to a jury trial and was tried
before a district judge. At trial, the two principal witnesses testified
about both the firearms and narcotics charges. 233 The court found
Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not guilty on the firearms
charges.?3

After the trial, Bagley filed a Freedom of Information and Privacy
Act request for documents and discovered copies of contracts that the
two principal witnesses signed with the ATF during the undercover
investigation." These contracts obligated the Government to pay the
witnesses money commensurate with the information furnished. 236
Bagley unsuccessfully sought to set aside his conviction in the district
court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the district judge that the nondisclosure was harmless
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Id. at 669-70.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 670-71.
See id. at 671.
See id.

236. See id.
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and reversed Bagley's conviction. 7 The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit. 238
Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court. Parts I
and II of his opinion commanded a majority of the Justices. He was
critical of the Ninth Circuit for distinguishing between failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence and failure to disclose impeaching
evidence: "This Court has rejected any such distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence." 9 This sentence is
remarkable for its failure to address the false testimony line of cases.
That line established that, when failure to disclose impeachment
material known to the government resulted in false testimony being
presented, a defendant was denied due process if the false testimony
contributed to the conviction.2' Assuming that the two key witnesses
took the stand and represented that they had no interest in whether or
not Bagley was convicted, their testimony created a false impression.
Because they were key witnesses, their false testimony would have
been viewed with alarm in earlier cases.24' To support this dramatic
break with precedent, Justice Blackmun cited only Giglio for the
proposition that nondisclosure of impeachment evidence does not
always require reversal of a conviction..2 42 Giglio is a weak reed on
which to rest this assertion regarding impeachment evidence,
however. Giglio involved both a Napue and a Brady analysis, but the
Court did not separate these two analyses in its opinion. 43 As a result
of incorrectly analyzing Giglio, the Bagley opinion established that
"[a] new trial is required if 'the false testimony could... in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury."'"z
Justice Blackmun effectively narrowed Alcorta and Napue without
disclosing or recognizing the import of his opinion. Nowhere in his
opinion does he offer any explanation for choosing to treat Bagley as
a Brady case rather than as a false testimony case. Justice Blackmun
simply assumed that the case was a Brady case.
The likely
explanation is that, once Justice Stevens stated in Agurs that there was
a line of cases that involved perjured testimony and that it really was
just a strand of Brady, the Court lost sight of the true nature of the

237. See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983).
238. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684.
239. Id at 676.
240. See supra Parts III, IV.A-B.
241. Because Bagley was tried by a judge without a jury, it is arguable that the
judge's findings that the undisclosed evidence would not have resulted in a different
verdict should be given deference. But, it is somewhat unclear whether Bagley would
have waived a jury had he been given the exculpatory material, or whether his
strategy in dealing with the key witnesses would have changed had he possessed the

impeachment material.
242- See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-77.
243. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
244. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154).
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prior cases. 245
Once it decided that Bagley was not a false statement case, the
Court was divided about how to deal with the nondisclosure. Justice
Blackmun's opinion suggested a standard for all Brady cases except
those involving the knowing use of perjured testimony: "The
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a
'
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."246
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
did not join this part of Justice Blackmun's opinion and did not
elaborate on a general standard to be applied irrespective of the
specificity of a defense request. Justice White agreed with Justice
Blackmun that "'evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.' 247 There were
thus five votes to remand the case to the court of appeals to apply the
standard set forth by Justice Blackmun to the facts. 248
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented and argued
that "[w]hen the Government withholds from a defendant evidence
that might impeach the prosecution's only witnesses, that failure to
disclose cannot be deemed harmless error. '249 Oddly, Justice Marshall
cited Napue only in passing and focused most of his attention on
25
Giglio and Agurs.- ° Justice Marshall also cited Pyle in passing. '
Justice Marshall would have reversed the conviction, but he never
made the case that Bagley was the victim of false testimony and
should have had the benefit of Mooney and Pyle, as developed in
Alcorta and Napue.
Justice Stevens also dissented and, in the process, continued to refer
to the Mooney line of cases as limited to perjured testimony. z z Justice
Stevens concluded that this was a "specific request" case and that the
evidence was material. 3 In a footnote, Justice Stevens indicated that
245. In Part III of his opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun
referred to the Agurs discussion of perjured testimony and treated the Mooney line of
cases as had Justice Stevens in Agurs. In the second paragraph of footnote 8,
however, Justice Blackmun recognized that Napue involved false testimony. See id. at
679 n.8. By footnote 9, though, Justice Blackmun returned to calling Napue, as well
as other cases, perjury cases. See id. at 679-80 n.9.
246. Id. at 682.
247. Id. at 685 (White, J., concurring).
248. It appears from Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (5th Cir. 1995), that the Court
treats Bagley as having decided the standard for both specific and general or no
request cases. See id. at 433-34.
249. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 690-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 709-10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
253. See id. at 712-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Court was indeed limiting Mooney et al. to perjured testimony: "I
of course agree with Justice Blackmun... and Justice Marshall...
that our long line of precedents establishing the 'reasonable
likelihood' standard for use of perjured testimony remains intact."1
In Bagley, no Justice appeared concerned with false testimony
unless it amounted to perjury.255 The Court's earlier concern that
prosecutors not create false impressions of the truth disappeared
without even an acknowledgement.
V. RETURNING TO STRICKLER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

A. Back to Stoltzfiis
The prosecution's use of Stoltzfus to convict Strickler and obtain
the death penalty likely would have been classified as the use of false
testimony by Mooney and Pyle, as developed in Alcorta and Napue.
The prosecutor created the impression before the jury of a witness
who was certain in her identifications, clear in her memory, and
consistent in her recall. Nothing could have been further from the
truth. Given how little Stoltzfus could recall before she met with the
police and before she spent time with the victim's flanc6, there is
reason to doubt whether her testimony was the product of memory or
coaching. It is not easy to tell from the various opinions whether
Detective Claytor was present during Stoltzfus's testimony, or
whether he assisted the prosecutor in preparing her as a witness. --6 It
is difficult to believe, however, that Claytor lacked an understanding
of how dramatically Stoltzfus's memory changed as she met with
Claytor. It seems likely that, in an investigation of such a brutal
crime, the detective would have discussed witnesses with the
prosecutor as they were found and interviewed.
As I have explained above, it is not at all clear that in Alcorta the
key prosecution witness lied.3 His answers created a false impression
about his relationship with Alcorta's wife, but technically his answers
might have been true. That was irrelevant to the Supreme Court,
because the Court understood that a false impression had been
created."8 In Napue, the argument that Hamer lied is stronger,
although there is conflicting evidence of what the prosecutor told
Hamer he would do for him and not much evidence about Hamer's
understanding of what the prosecutor would do for him.25 9 Chief
Justice Warren did not find remand necessary to determine whether
254. Id. at 713 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
255. Justice Powell did not participate in the case.
256. See supra Parts I, II.

257. See supra Part III.C.
258. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
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there was perjury. 26° The Chief Justice had been a prosecutor. He
surely was aware that the question and answer about promises or
rewards might have resulted in truthful testimony, because Hamer
might not have been promised anything that he would have viewed as
a reward. Moreover, the question and answer about whether the trial
prosecutor had promised that he would make a sentence
recommendation might have resulted in technically truthful
testimony, because the prosecutor may have said that a sentencing
recommendation would be made without indicating who would make
it. 261 Chief Justice Warren did not parse words, however. He viewed
the testimony as a reasonable person would and found that it was
false. 262 It created a false impression for the jury.
I submit that the impression created by the prosecutor's questioning
of Stoltzfus was equally false. Stoltzfus was not a witness who had a
clearly reliable memory, made identifications without hesitation, or
was consistent in recalling facts. Yet, she appeared to be such a
witness. The Supreme Court treated Strickler as a Brady case and
held that Strickler "ha[d] not shown that there [was] a reasonable
probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different
had these materials been disclosed. 26 3 Had the Court viewed the case
as governed by the false testimony line, the question of materiality or
prejudice would have been framed much differently. As Justice
Stevens stated in Agurs, "the Court has consistently held that a
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured6 testimony is
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment
of the jury."265 For reasons already stated, I believe that there is little
doubt that the withheld evidence could have cast sufficient doubt on
the events as related by Stoltzfus to make a jury reluctant to return a
death sentence.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court no longer seems to
recognize that there is something pernicious about a prosecutor
creating false impressions about the truth. Whether or not a
prosecutor is always able to appreciate how evidence might be
exculpatory to a defendant, 26 a prosecutor and his or her assistants
know or ought to know when false testimony is being presented and
that presentation of such testimony is unacceptable. 261
260. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
261. As noted above, there are several explanations of Hamer's testimony that
would disqualify it as perjury. See supra Part III.C.
262. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
263. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1955 (1999).
264. Of course, I would substitute the word "false" here to be consistent with
Alcorta and Napue.
265. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (emphasis added).
266. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
267. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Alcorta v. Texas, 355
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Examples that Cause Concern

Suppose the following scenario occurred: (1) Stoltzfus had read in
the newspaper details about the police investigation, went to the
police, and said that she had been at the mall, but she could not
remember what she saw; (2) Detective Claytor spent some time with
her asking her whether she might have seen certain people and
showed her pictures; (3) the police had Stoltzfus hypnotized; and (4)
after being hypnotized and talking further with Detective Claytor,
Stoltzfus had a strong memory of seeing Strickler in the mall and of
some of his wild actions.
If the prosecutor calls Stoltzfus to testify, elicits from her the postinterview, post-hypnotic statements, and paints a picture of her as a
witness who has a great memory, is confident about her memory, and
has no doubt about what she saw, is this the presentation of false
testimony?
I think it is, at least if the prosecutor has not disclosed the
interviews and the hypnosis to the defendant. It is possible that
defense counsel might ask a witness whether she has been hypnotized,
but it is more plausible to think that no such question would be asked
without a good faith basis to support it. The failure to disclose facts
that would cause a reasonable person to doubt whether the testimony
of a witness is what the prosecution claims is tantamount to the
presentation of false testimony. At one time, it seems that the
Supreme Court would have said so, but that is no longer necessarily
true.
It is important to add at this point that my conclusion about the
impermissibility of offering false testimony applies to defense counsel
as well as to prosecutors. If a defense lawyer placed a witness with no
memory or a poor memory under hypnosis and the witness's memory
suddenly were outstanding, there would be a duty to disclose the
hypnosis to the prosecution. The difference between the obligations
of prosecutors and defense counsel is that only prosecutors may have
a constitutional responsibility to disclose or not to use testimony that
is false and misleading. At least, prosecutors bore this responsibility
at one time. Today, there may be reason for doubt.
Another example may augment my point. Let us return to Alcorta
and the testimony of Castilleja, but with a slight change in the facts.
Suppose that Castilleja and Alcorta's wife had engaged frequently in
oral sex but not sexual intercourse, and the prosecutor, fully aware of
the extent of the oral sex, asked this question: "Have you ever had
sex with Mrs. Alcorta, at any time or any place?" If Alcorta had
defined sex the same way that President Clinton did when he was

U.S. 28,31-32 (1957) (per curiam).
268. No corresponding duty is imposed upon defense counsel.
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examined during his deposition in Jones v. Clinton,269 a "no" answer
would have been truthful. If the prosecutor had been appointed by
the President and shared this definition of sex, he or she would have
been eliciting truthful testimony as he or she understood it. However,
would any reasonable person say that this was something other than
false testimony? I hope not.
Under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, the deliberate
elicitation of false and misleading evidence is not perjury, and the
failure to disclose the oral sex apparently would amount to a Brady
violation and be judged by a materiality standard that encourages the
prosecutor to mislead the jury and leave it to a judge afterwards to
assess materiality. I stated at the outset that Judge Wright was
correct, in my opinion, to conclude that President Clinton testified
falsely in his deposition. I believe that the testimony of the two key
witnesses in Bagley and of Stoltzfus in Stricklerwere equally false and
misleading. I see no reason to condemn witnesses in civil depositions
who seek to create false impressions of actual facts, but to do nothing
when government prosecutors create equally false impressions of
actual facts at a criminal trial.
I do not draw a line between knowing elicitation of false testimony
by a prosecutor and by a defense counsel in similar circumstances.
False testimony is false testimony. Suppose, for example, in a selfdefense homicide case, the defense calls a witness who will testify that
he talked with the victim hours before the killing, the victim told the
witness that he was planning to kill the defendant, and the witness saw
the victim with a gun. Suppose also that the witness confessed to
defense counsel prior to trial that he was involved in a long-standing
affair with the victim's wife, that the victim had threatened him, and
that he was glad the victim was dead. Could a defense lawyer ask the
witness on direct examination whether the witness had any reason to
say something negative about the victim if the expected answer is
"no?"
I hope not. This would be deliberately eliciting false
testimony, even if the witness had reached the subconscious
conclusion that his affair with the victim's wife did not matter. If
defense counsel does not ask the witness anything about his
relationship to the victim, but the prosecutor asks whether the witness
had any relationship with the victim, a different question arises if the
witness says "no," although the answer to the question is the same as
the previous one. Even if the witness defines "relationship" in some
narrow manner, the answer "no" must be viewed as false by fairminded people. Is it wrong for defense counsel to permit a false
answer to stand, even if it arguably is not perjury? I prefer an
affirmative answer to the question, notwithstanding the fact that it
raises difficult questions of how defense counsel can deal with the
269. 57 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
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witness's false testimony without becoming a witness in the case. I
choose not to deal with this subject now, because I do not want to lose
my focus on the burden once placed by the Supreme Court on
prosecutors not to offer false testimony, which is not a burden the
Court has placed on defense counsel.
C.

The Future

Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court will breathe new life
into the Mooney line of cases and say again what it said in Alcorta and
Napue. I believe that the Court drifted away from the Mooney
principle in Agurs without any apparent awareness of the movement
that was occurring. It seems undeniable that, after it decided Brady
and expanded upon the Mooney principle, the Court has tended to
refer to most prosecutorial nondisclosure issues as Brady issues and
limited the Mooney principle to perjury situations that rarely arise.
The fundamental point of this Article is to emphasize that false and
misleading testimony produces the same distortion of the truth and
likelihood of a wrong conviction as does perjured testimony. There is
no reason to limit the Mooney principle to clear perjury, and there is
every reason to apply it, as in Alcorta and Napue, to testimony that is
false, whether or not the prosecutor and/or witness harbored a
subconscious belief that in some strained way the testimony could be
taken as something other than perjury.
If the Supreme Court does not breathe new life into the Mooney
principle as a matter of constitutional law, my hope is that state and
federal courts will condemn, as Judge Wright did in Jones v. Clinton."
the offer of false testimony. Most courts have authority to deal with
ethical violations, as do state bars. The ethics rules that currently exist
provide a basis for dealing with lawyers who offer false testimony, and
the inherent power of courts to sanction wrongdoing should be
sufficient to deal with witnesses who offer false testimony.
It is interesting to look at the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and how they deal with presentation of
false and misleading material. Although Rule 3.3(a)(1) states that
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact
or law to a tribunal,"2 " Rule 3.4(b) states that "[a] lawyer shall not...
counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely. '' m There is no materiality
provision in Rule 3.4(b). Lawyers cannot assist a witness in testifying
falsely about anything. The rule covers prosecutors and defense
counsel as well as lawyers in civil cases. Rule 3.8(d) imposes special
responsibilities on a prosecutor to "make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
270. Id
271. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1998) (emphasis added).
272. Id Rule 3.4(b).
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tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and,
in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor."273 There is no materiality limitation. Any information
that shows that prosecution testimony or evidence is false tends to
negate the guilt of the accused and would be mitigating evidence at
sentencing. These rules, therefore, should provide courts with
authority to make the Mooney principle meaningful as a matter of
professional responsibility, even if the Supreme Court abandons it as a
matter of constitutional law.
The Model Rules state principles that also find support in the
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration
of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function. Standard 3-5.6(a)
provides that "[a] prosecutor should not knowingly offer false
evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony
of witnesses, or fail to seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its
falsity."' 74 This is a strong statement of the Mooney principle. The
Defense Function Standard 4-7.5(a) imposes a similar obligation on
defense counsel: "Defense counsel should not knowingly offer false
evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony
of witnesses, or fail to take reasonable remedial measures upon
discovery of its falsity."'27 These rules are consistent with the Model
Rules and with what most judges and lawyers would readily accept as
part of a lawyer's professional obligations. If the courts use their
inherent power to regulate lawyers who appear before them, these
rules also suggest a non-constitutional basis for condemning the
knowing use of false testimony.
CONCLUSION

There are substantial reasons to be concerned with the ways
prosecutors and police handle evidence. They have a virtual
monopoly in criminal cases on the use of the pretrial judicial process
to gather evidence. They can use grand juries to gather testimony and
evidence, something suspects and defendants cannot do. Aside from
the use of formal process, uniformed or badge-carrying law
enforcement officers have a cachet that often permits them entry to
premises and access to evidence that suspects and defendants do not
have. It is this superior access that helps to explain why the ABA
Model Rule 3.8(d) as well as the Supreme Court's Brady decision
impose an obligation on prosecutors to share evidence with
defendants. In our adversary system, any limitation like "materiality"
273. Id. Rule 3.8(d).
274. ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.6(a) (1998).
275. ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Defense Function, Standard 4-7.5(a) (1998).
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invites prosecutors and their law enforcement assistants to make their
own biased judgments about materiality. In many instances, withheld
evidence will never see the light of day, and there will be no judicial
review of the decision not to disclose. Even when there is judicial
review, it almost always will come after a defendant is convicted and
often after appeal rights are exhausted, so that courts know they must
start the process over if they grant relief because of a suppression of
evidence. It is not surprising that courts are reluctant to do so.
Brady violations are a serious problem in our justice system. As
concerned as we should be about these violations and about the
system that gives prosecutors the right to be the judge with respect to
disclosure of evidence, it is another concern that animates this Article:
that is, a concern about the increasing willingness of courts, including
the Supreme Court, to ignore false testimony either because they
cannot recognize it or do not care about it. If anyone who reads this
Article thinks that the Stoltzfus testimony in the Strickler case was
"true," he or she need not worry about fairness in our criminal justice
system. But, those who share my opinion that no one could regard the
way that testimony was presented-at least as the Supreme Court
described it-as a true presentation have every reason to worry.
There is every reason to worry because the testimony was misleading
in so many respects that, in my opinion, only someone who believes
that truth and falsity are totally individual, relative concepts that do
not exist, except as individuals choose to recognize them, would say
that the Stoltzfus testimony was truthful and fair. The Supreme
Court's concern was whether material exculpatory evidence was
hidden from Strickler. My concern is that the Supreme Court has so
narrowed its focus with respect to violations once recognized as
Mooney-type violations that it cares little about anything that is not
obvious perjury. False testimony should worry us. Misleading
testimony should worry us. Withholding evidence that would tend to
make a reasonable person disbelieve what a witness says is the same
as presenting a false version of the witness's testimony. That is what I
would like our courts to say. I hope they will say it as a matter of
constitutional law. If they do not, I hope they and we will say it and
mean it as we enforce rules of professional responsibility.
I began this Article with reference to Judge Wright's sanction of
President Clinton, and I end by recalling one unforgettable moment in
the President's grand jury testimony of August 17, 1998:
QUESTION: Mr. President, I want to go into a new subject area,
briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. Bittman.
The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the Paula Jones
deposition-counsel is fully aware-it's page 54, line 5. Counsel is
fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky is filing, has an affidavit, which they
were in possession of, saying that there was absolutely no sex of any
kind in any manner, shape or form with President Clinton. That
statement was made by your attorney in front of Judge Susan
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Webber Wright.
CLINTON: That's correct.
QUESTION: Your-that statement is a completely false statement.
Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky, the statement that there was no sex of any kind in any
manner, shape or form with President Clinton was an utterly false
statement. Is that correct?
CLINTON: It depends upon what the meaning of the word is
means. If is means is, and never has been, that's one thing. If it
means, there is none, that was a completely true statement. 76
This is not the time or place to debate whether the last answer given
by the President was technically correct or whether his silence in the
face of his attorney's representation to Judge Wright during the
deposition constitutes obstruction of justice. The debate over these
matters is less important to me than the message being sent by the
President, which is that false statements and false testimony do not
matter. For me, it does not "depend[] upon what the meaning of the
word is means." The statement by attorney Bennett to the Court was
false; it is almost impossible to believe that the President did not hear
it and thus did not correct it, and the President's contention in his
grand jury testimony that somehow the Bennett statement could be "a
completely true statement" evinces an unwillingness or inability to
separate truth from falsity in the way ordinary people do every day.
We need our lawyers, especially our prosecutors, to be able to identify
false testimony and abjure it. We need a Supreme Court that cares
when false testimony is offered, not a Court whose efforts match the
President's in tone deafness to falsity. We must return to Alcorta and
Napue and give them their due.

276. President Clinton's Videotaped Grand Jury Testimony, Segment 3, Aug. 17,
1998, availablein 1998 WL 644125.

